

# Depolarising Social Networks: Optimisation of Exposure to Adverse Opinions in the Presence of a Backfire Effect

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
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
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- 5** Application to US congress

# Polarisation and echo chambers (1)



#beefban



#russia\_march



retweets network




followers network

Garimella *et al.*(2016). Quantifying Controversy in Social Media. WSDM '16. <https://doi.org/10.1145/2835776.2835792>.

# Polarisation and echo chambers (2)

retweets network



Weber *et al.*(2020). #ArsonEmergency and Australia's "Black Summer": Polarisation and Misinformation on Social Media. MISDOOM 2020. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61841-4\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61841-4_11)

Can we open up echo chambers by promoting diversity of opinions and cross-cutting links?

Constraint: backfire effect.

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## Setting

- social network
- $N$  users
- individual opinions in  $\{0, 1\}$

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## Dynamics

At each step, a user chosen uniformly at random adopts the opinion of a random neighbour of them.

**If the graph is connected, everyone eventually agrees.**

## Framework

- Connected, directed, weighted user graph.
- $(z_0, z_1)$  zealots: in-degree 0.
- $F = N - z_0 - z_1$  free users.

## Framework



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## Long-time behaviour

- 1  $z_0 > 0, z_1 = 0 \Rightarrow$  almost surely everyone eventually has opinion 0.
- 2  $z_0 = 0, z_1 > 0 \Rightarrow$  almost surely everyone eventually has opinion 1.
- 3  $z_0 > 0, z_1 > 0 \Rightarrow$  equilibrium state.

We assume  $z_0 + z_1 > 0$ .

# Example



Directed, weighted graph (Masuda, 2015)

For a free user  $i$

$$x_i^* = \frac{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{F}} w_{ij} x_j^* + z_{1,i}}{d_i}. \quad (1)$$

Directed, weighted graph (Masuda, 2015)

For a free user  $i$

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Complete, unweighted graph

$$x_i^* = \frac{z_1}{z_0 + z_1}. \quad (2)$$

$z_0$  is given. Find the optimal  $z_1 \geq 0$  to maximise either

- 1 Average diversity of opinions, or
- 2 Average proportion of active links.

**Backfire effect:**  $\alpha z_1$  free nodes will become 0-zealots ( $\alpha \leq 1$ ).

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## Average diversity of opinion at equilibrium

$$\sigma = 4\bar{x}^*(1 - \bar{x}^*) \in [0, 1] \quad (3)$$

where

$$\bar{x}^* = \frac{1}{N} \mathbf{1}^\top [L + \text{diag}(Z_0 + Z_1)]^{-1} Z_1 \mathbf{1} + \frac{z_1}{N} \quad (4)$$

is the average opinion at equilibrium over the whole network.

## Maximisation

Given  $z_0$ , there exists  $z_1$  for which  $\sigma = 1$ .


## Average diversity of opinion at equilibrium

$$\sigma = \frac{4z_0 z_1}{(z_0 + z_1)^2}. \quad (5)$$


## Maximisation

Given  $z_0$  and backfire effect  $\alpha$ , we find  $z_1^*$  that maximises  $\sigma$  via  $\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial z_1} = 0$ .

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active link



inactive link

# Density of active links at equilibrium



$q_{ij}$ : probability of finding  $j \rightarrow i$  active.

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## Single edge

A mean-field approximation of  $q$  is given by the solution of a linear system that depends on edge weights and equilibrium opinions  $x^*$ .

$$q_{ij}(d_i + d_j) - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i, j\}} (w_{ik} q_{jk} + w_{jk} q_{ik}) = \tilde{z}_j x_i^* + \tilde{z}_i x_j^* + z_{1,i} + z_{1,j} \quad (6)$$

where  $\tilde{z}_k = z_{0,k} - z_{1,k}$ .

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

## Density of active links

$\rho$ : average of all the  $q_{ij}$ .



$\rho_w$ : weighted average.

# Numerical example

Erdős-Rényi graph with random uniform weights



Barabasi-Albert graph with random exponential weights



On a complete, unweighted user graph:

$$\rho = \frac{2z_0 z_1 (N - z_0 - z_1)}{(N - 1)(z_0 + z_1)(z_0 + z_1 + 1)}. \quad (7)$$

## Maximisation

Given  $z_0$  and backfire effect  $\alpha$ , we find  $z_1^*$  that maximises  $\rho$  via  $\frac{\partial \rho}{\partial z_1} = 0$ .

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
- Composition of the US House of Representatives since 1947.
- $K = 38$  Houses total.
- $D_k$ : number of Democrat seats in the  $k^{\text{th}}$  House.
- $R_k$ : number of Republican seats in the  $k^{\text{th}}$  House.

## Fundamental hypothesis

Assume  $D_k, R_k$  correspond to punctual observations of the Voter Model.

$$D_k + R_k > 95\% \text{ for all } k.$$

# Illustration



Adris *et al.*(2015). The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House of Representatives. PLOS ONE 10(4): e0123507. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0123507>

## Number of zealots

$$(\hat{z}_D, \hat{z}_R) = \operatorname{argmin}_{(z_D, z_R) \in Z} \frac{|\hat{\sigma} - \sigma| + |\hat{\rho} - \rho|}{2} \quad (Q)$$

## Empirical opinion diversity

$$\hat{\sigma} = \frac{4}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{D_k R_k}{(D_k + R_k)^2}. \quad (8)$$

## Empirical active links density

$$\hat{\rho} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{2D_k R_k - D_k z_R - R_k z_D}{N_k(N_k - 1)}. \quad (9)$$

**Solve by exhaustive search.**


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
## Estimates

- $(\hat{z}_D, \hat{z}_R) = (89, 63)$
- $(\hat{\sigma}, \hat{\rho}) = (0.97, 0.32)$
- $\frac{|\hat{\sigma} - \sigma| + |\hat{\rho} - \rho|}{2} = 3.8 \times 10^{-5}$

# Maximisation of $\sigma$ and $\rho$



# Maximisation of $\sigma$ and $\rho$



What we did...

- Closed formula for the average opinion diversity at equilibrium.
- Closed formula for the average density of active links at equilibrium.
- How to maximise them on a complete graph.
- Application to an American politics dataset.

What's next...

- Maximisation on directed, weighted, non-complete user graphs.
- Optimise on the edge weights  $\equiv$  platform recommendations.
- Data from online social networks.